Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
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Publication:4016221
Recommendations
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1054714
- Iterative information update and stability of strategies
Cited in
(90)- Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results
- Aggregation of expert opinions
- Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games
- Approximate implementation in the absence of externalities and aggregate feasibility constraints
- Extensive form implementation in incomplete information environments
- Motives and implementation: On the design of mechanisms to elicit opinions
- Efficient private production of public goods under common agency
- Implementation in economic environments with incomplete information: The use of multi-stage games
- Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information
- Cooperative processing of information via choice at an information set
- Implementing coordinated team play
- Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types
- A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation
- Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection
- Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide
- On run-preventing contract design
- Inspired and inspiring: Hervé Moulin and the discovery of the beauty contest game
- Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations
- Implementation via rights structures
- A characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation
- Virtual implementation in backwards induction
- Virtual implementation in separable Bayesian environments using simple mechanisms
- Behavioral aspects of implementation theory
- Robust virtual implementation: toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine
- Designing referenda: an economist's pessimistic perspective
- Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information
- Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences
- Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms
- On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms
- Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
- Strictly strategy-proof auctions
- Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions
- Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs
- Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?
- Implementation without expected utility: ex-post verifiability
- Constrained implementation
- Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals
- Implementation without incentive compatibility: two stories with partially informed planners
- Mechanism design with side payments: individual rationality and iterative dominance
- Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization
- Subgame perfect implementation of voting rules via randomized mechanisms
- Outcome-robust mechanisms for Nash implementation
- Mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments
- Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
- Finite supermodular design with interdependent valuations
- Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules
- Process manipulation in unique implementation
- Role of honesty in full implementation
- An impossibility result for virtual implementation with status quo
- Continuous virtual implementation: complete information
- Informed principal problems in bilateral trading
- Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information
- Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
- Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness
- Virtual Bayesian Implementation
- Implementation with partial provability
- Full implementation in backward induction
- Interdependent preferences and strategic distinguishability
- Rationalizable implementation of correspondences
- Recent Results on Implementation with Complete Information
- Segmentation, incentives, and privacy
- Implementation with Near-Complete Information
- Rationalizable implementation
- Repetition and signalling: Experimental evidence from games with efficient equilibria
- Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality
- Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima
- Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching
- Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge
- Implementation in strong core by codes of rights
- Binary mechanism for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences
- Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation
- Robust Incentives for Teams
- Robust implementation in general mechanisms
- Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
- A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies
- Honesty and epistemological implementation of social choice functions with asymmetric information
- Using divide-and-conquer to improve tax collection
- Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
- Introduction to experimental game theory
- Implementation by iterative dominance and backward induction: An experimental comparison
- Robust implementation with costly information
- Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies
- Leveraging possibilistic beliefs in unrestricted combinatorial auctions
- Monotonicity and robust implementation under forward-induction reasoning
- Strengthening incentives for truth-telling in majority voting
- Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support
- Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
- Complexity and repeated implementation
- Detail-free mechanism design in twice iterative dominance: Large economies
- A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions
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