Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support
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Publication:845019
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2009.06.011zbMATH Open1197.91083OpenAlexW2267374399MaRDI QIDQ845019FDOQ845019
François Maniquet, Olivier Bochet
Publication date: 5 February 2010
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/IRES/2006-43.pdf
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Cites Work
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
- A new approach to the implementation problem
- Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization
- Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
- Implementing Efficient Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations
- Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
- Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
- A study of proportionality and robustness in economies with a commonly owned technology.
- Implementation in perfect equilibria
- Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem
Cited In (6)
- Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences
- A solution to the two-person implementation problem
- Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
- An impossibility result for virtual implementation with status quo
- On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules
- A new monotonicity condition for tournament solutions
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