Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
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Publication:694739
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2012.09.004zbMATH Open1263.91014OpenAlexW3121258188MaRDI QIDQ694739FDOQ694739
Authors: Claudio Mezzetti, Ludovic Renou 
Publication date: 13 December 2012
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/271298/files/twerp_902.pdf
Recommendations
implementationsocial choice correspondenceMaskin monotonicitypure and mixed Nash equilibriumset-monotonicity
Cites Work
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- Bayesian Implementation
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
- Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation
- Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
- Nash implementation without no-veto power
- Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support
Cited In (24)
- Nash implementation via hyperfunctions
- Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
- Dynamic implementation in two-agent economies
- Nash implementation of the majority rule
- Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences
- Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information
- A solution to the two-person implementation problem
- On implementation via demand commitment games
- Rationalizable implementation of correspondences
- Implementation in largest consistent set via rights structures
- Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima
- Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium
- Mixed strategy implementation under ambiguity
- Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs
- Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent
- Complexity and repeated implementation
- Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- Continuous virtual implementation: complete information
- Full Nash implementation of neutral social functions
- Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility
- Bayesian implementation with verifiable information
- Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation
- Mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments
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