Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
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Publication:694739
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2012.09.004zbMath1263.91014OpenAlexW3121258188MaRDI QIDQ694739
Claudio Mezzetti, Ludovic Renou
Publication date: 13 December 2012
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/271298/files/twerp_902.pdf
implementationsocial choice correspondenceMaskin monotonicitypure and mixed Nash equilibriumset-monotonicity
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