Subgame perfect implementation of voting rules via randomized mechanisms

DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0209-9zbMath1180.91101OpenAlexW2146462531MaRDI QIDQ2385120

Hannu Vartiainen

Publication date: 11 October 2007

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0209-9

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (4)

On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules ⋮ Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences

Cites Work

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• Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
• Implementation via backward induction
• Implementation in perfect equilibria
• Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
• Virtual implementation in backwards induction
• Implementing generalized Condorcet social choice functions via backward induction
• Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization
• Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
• Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information

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