Subgame perfect implementation of voting rules via randomized mechanisms
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Publication:2385120
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Cites work
- A course in game theory.
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 44383 (Why is no real title available?)
- Implementation in perfect equilibria
- Implementation via backward induction
- Implementing generalized Condorcet social choice functions via backward induction
- Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization
- Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
- Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
- Virtual implementation in backwards induction
- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
- Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
Cited in
(10)- Whose opinion counts? Implementation by sortition
- Designing referenda: an economist's pessimistic perspective
- On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules
- Implementation via approval mechanisms
- The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable
- Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules
- Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences
- Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms
- Non-cooperative rational interactive proofs
- Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
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