Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2005.06.008zbMath1280.91061OpenAlexW2068693303MaRDI QIDQ2370493

Hannu Vartiainen

Publication date: 26 June 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.06.008

zbMATH Keywords

characterizationimplementationsubgame perfect equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support ⋮ Subgame perfect implementation of voting rules via randomized mechanisms ⋮ Random extensive form games ⋮ One-step-ahead implementation ⋮ Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions: comment ⋮ Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility ⋮ Privacy in implementation ⋮ Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization ⋮ Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies ⋮ Repeated implementation with overlapping generations of agents ⋮ On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules ⋮ Do coalitions matter in designing institutions? ⋮ Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences

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