Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2020.105038zbMath1454.91080OpenAlexW3014182614MaRDI QIDQ2211468

Christoph Müller

Publication date: 11 November 2020

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105038

zbMATH Keywords

robust implementationdynamic mechanismsdynamic robust monotonicityweak perfect Bayesian equilibriumweak rationalizability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (2)

An alternative equivalent formulation for robust implementation ⋮ Order independence for rationalizability

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games
• Rationalizability in continuous games
• Robust implementation in general mechanisms
• Robust dynamic implementation
• Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
• Extensive form implementation in incomplete information environments
• Implementation in economic environments with incomplete information: The use of multi-stage games
• A note on the implications of common knowledge of rationality
• Implementation with extensive form games: one round of signaling is not enough
• Perfect Bayesian implementation
• Robust virtual implementation: toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine
• Interactive epistemology in simple dynamic games with a continuum of strategies
• Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization
• A short and constructive proof of Tarski's fixed-point theorem
• Perfect Bayesian implementation in economic environments
• Higher Order Uncertainty and Information: Static and Dynamic Games
• On a new axiomatic theory of probability
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms
• Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• On the structure of rationalizability for arbitrary spaces of uncertainty
• Robust Predictions in Infinite-Horizon Games--an Unrefinable Folk Theorem
• Robust Mechanism Design
• Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms
• A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
• Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality

This page was built for publication: Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies