Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies
This paper deals with conditions for full robust implementation of social choice functions. First the formulation of the problem of full robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian equilibrium is addressed. General conditions for robust implementability by dynamic mechanisms, imposing Bayesian updating as the only belief-revision assumption, are provided. The notion of weakly rationalizable implementation is introduced. It is proved that, under a conditional no-total indifference condition, necessary and sufficient conditions for weakly rationalizable implementation and for robust weakly perfect Bayesian equilibrium implementability coincide.
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