Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies
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Cites work
- A course in game theory.
- A note on the implications of common knowledge of rationality
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- A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games
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- Extensive form implementation in incomplete information environments
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- Implementation in economic environments with incomplete information: The use of multi-stage games
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- Perfect Bayesian implementation
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- Rationalizability in continuous games
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- Robust dynamic implementation
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- Robust implementation in general mechanisms
- Robust Mechanism Design
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- Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality
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- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization
- Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
Cited in
(25)- Implementation in perfect equilibria
- Perfect Bayesian implementation
- Robust coalitional implementation
- Weak implementation
- Perfect Bayesian implementation in economic environments
- Robust implementation in direct mechanisms
- Subgame-perfect implementation under information perturbations
- A robustness result for rationalizable implementation
- Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality
- An alternative equivalent formulation for robust implementation
- Order independence for rationalizability
- Save, spend, or give? A model of housing, family insurance, and savings in old age
- Hazed and confused: the effect of air pollution on dementia
- IQ, expectations, and choice
- Optimal feedback in contests
- Unemployment insurance in macroeconomic stabilization
- A welfare analysis of occupational licensing in U.S. states
- A network solution to robust implementation: the case of identical but unknown distributions
- A more credible approach to parallel trends
- Testing the production approach to markup estimation
- Stratification trees for adaptive randomisation in randomised controlled trials
- Monotonicity and robust implementation under forward-induction reasoning
- Robust dynamic implementation
- Strategic and structural uncertainty in robust implementation
- Perfect Bayesian implementation when the planner is a player
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