Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies
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Publication:2211468
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2020.105038zbMATH Open1454.91080OpenAlexW3014182614MaRDI QIDQ2211468FDOQ2211468
Publication date: 11 November 2020
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105038
Recommendations
robust implementationdynamic mechanismsdynamic robust monotonicityweak perfect Bayesian equilibriumweak rationalizability
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Cited In (17)
- An alternative equivalent formulation for robust implementation
- Order independence for rationalizability
- Implementation in perfect equilibria
- Perfect Bayesian implementation when the planner is a player
- Perfect Bayesian implementation in economic environments
- Robust implementation in direct mechanisms
- A network solution to robust implementation: the case of identical but unknown distributions
- A more credible approach to parallel trends
- A welfare analysis of occupational licensing in U.S. states
- Hazed and confused: the effect of air pollution on dementia
- IQ, expectations, and choice
- Optimal feedback in contests
- Save, spend, or give? A model of housing, family insurance, and savings in old age
- Stratification trees for adaptive randomisation in randomised controlled trials
- Testing the production approach to markup estimation
- Unemployment insurance in macroeconomic stabilization
- Perfect Bayesian implementation
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