A robustness result for rationalizable implementation

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.08.001MaRDI QIDQ536103zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Alfredo Di Tillio

Publication date 16 May 2011

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.08.001

zbMATH Keywords

common knowledgeincomplete informationhigher-order beliefsmechanism designrationalizabilityrobust implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Recommendations

• Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information
• Rationalizable implementation
• Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality
• Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies
• Rationalizable implementation of correspondences

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4207454 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
• Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Robust Mechanism Design
• Robust implementation in direct mechanisms
• Robust virtual implementation: toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine

Cited in

(10)

• Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information
• Continuous level-\(k\) mechanism design
• An alternative equivalent formulation for robust implementation
• Efficient rational proofs with strong utility-gap guarantees
• An institution-independent proof of the Robinson consistency theorem
• Rationalizable implementation of correspondences
• Robust implementation in general mechanisms
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7070744 (Why is no real title available?)
• Interim rationalizable implementation of functions
• Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality

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