A robustness result for rationalizable implementation

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.08.001zbMATH Open1236.91076OpenAlexW2049895732MaRDI QIDQ536103FDOQ536103

Authors: Alfredo Di Tillio 

Publication date: 16 May 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.08.001

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zbMATH Keywords

common knowledgeincomplete informationhigher-order beliefsmechanism designrationalizabilityrobust implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
• Robust Mechanism Design
• A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Robust implementation in direct mechanisms
• Robust virtual implementation: toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine

Cited In (5)

• Efficient rational proofs with strong utility-gap guarantees
• Robust implementation in general mechanisms
• An institution-independent proof of the Robinson consistency theorem
• Continuous level-\(k\) mechanism design
• Title not available (Why is that?)

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