Rationalizable implementation of correspondences

DOI10.1287/MOOR.2018.0972zbMATH Open1437.91019OpenAlexW2480111125MaRDI QIDQ5108244FDOQ5108244

Authors: Takashi Kunimoto, Roberto Serrano 

Publication date: 30 April 2020

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/ffe34a7b38fae1edcd516836813a08a404b9766f

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zbMATH Keywords

implementationrationalizabilitycomplete informationsocial choice correspondenceuniform monotonicityMaskin monotonicity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Applications of game theory (91A80) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Cites Work

• Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
• A note on the implications of common knowledge of rationality
• Exact implementation
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• Rationalizable implementation
• Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
• A new approach to the implementation problem
• The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
• Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
• On constant Maskin monotonic social choice functions
• Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
• Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
• Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium, and Common Knowledge of Rationality
• A characterization of egalitarian equivalence

Cited In (9)

• A robustness result for rationalizable implementation
• Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences
• Rationalizable implementation
• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• Interim rationalizable implementation of functions
• Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms
• Continuous virtual implementation: complete information
• Behavioral implementation under incomplete information
• Rationalizable implementation of social choice functions: Complete characterization

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