Recommendations
Cited in
(29)- Role of honesty in full implementation
- Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences
- Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
- Nash implementation without no-veto power
- Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge
- Implementation without expected utility: ex-post verifiability
- Direct implementation with evidence
- One-step-ahead implementation
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Comprehensive rationalizability
- Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences
- Implementation without incentive compatibility: two stories with partially informed planners
- Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
- Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information
- Rationalizable implementation of correspondences
- Rationalizable implementation
- Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima
- Implementation by iterative dominance and backward induction: An experimental comparison
- Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions
- Behavioral aspects of implementation theory
- Implementing coordinated team play
- Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms
- Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information
- Continuous virtual implementation: complete information
- Implementation via backward induction
- Full implementation in backward induction
- Detail-free mechanism design in twice iterative dominance: Large economies
- Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
- Mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments
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