Exact implementation

DOI10.1006/JETH.1994.1051zbMATH Open0830.90003OpenAlexW4244669389MaRDI QIDQ1339736FDOQ1339736

Authors: Dilip Abreu, Hitoshi Matsushima 

Publication date: 8 December 1994

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1051

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3936498

zbMATH Keywords

implementationmechanismssocial choice functioniterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cited In (29)

• Role of honesty in full implementation
• Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences
• Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge
• Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
• Direct implementation with evidence
• Nash implementation without no-veto power
• Implementation without expected utility: ex-post verifiability
• One-step-ahead implementation
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• Comprehensive rationalizability
• Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences
• Implementation without incentive compatibility: two stories with partially informed planners
• Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
• Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information
• Rationalizable implementation of correspondences
• Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima
• Rationalizable implementation
• Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions
• Implementation by iterative dominance and backward induction: An experimental comparison
• Behavioral aspects of implementation theory
• Implementing coordinated team play
• Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms
• Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information
• Continuous virtual implementation: complete information
• Implementation via backward induction
• Full implementation in backward induction
• Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
• Detail-free mechanism design in twice iterative dominance: Large economies
• Mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments

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