Implementing coordinated team play

DOI10.1006/JETH.1996.2249MaRDI QIDQ1367913zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Anil Arya, John S. Hughes, Jonathani Glover

Publication date 6 May 1998

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.2249

zbMATH Keywords

joint productionmoral hazard model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Recommendations

• Joint production in teams
• Relational Incentives and Moral Hazard in Teams
• The optimality of team contracts
• Optimal Contracts for Teams
• Coalitions, incentives, and risk sharing

Cites work

• A Note on Abreu-Matsushima Mechanisms
• A simple forecasting mechanism for moral hazard settings
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Exact implementation
• Implementation in undominated Nash equilibria without integer games
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents
• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
• Stopping agents from ``cheating
• Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
• Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information

Cited in

(5)

• Inefficiency and complementarity in sharing games
• Implementation in teams
• A simple forecasting mechanism for moral hazard settings
• Voluntary implementation
• Joint production in teams

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