Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
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Recommendations
- Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
- Implementation in undominated Nash equilibria without integer games
- Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: the Pareto correspondence and a generalization
- Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
- Exact implementation
Cited in
(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
- The optimal design of a market
- Feasible Bayesian implementation with state dependent feasible sets
- Coalition-proof implementation
- Undominated Nash implementation with collusion and renegotiation
- An implementation-theoretic approach to non-cooperative foundations
- A nonparametric, efficient public good decision mechanism: Undominated Bayesian implementation
- Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information
- Nash implementation and double implementation: Equivalence theorems
- Undominated Nash implementation in bounded mechanisms
- Double implementation in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria in social choice environments
- Strategy-proof allotment rules
- Implementing coordinated team play
- Double implementation by a simple game form in the commons problem
- Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer?
- Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
- Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection
- Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide
- Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies
- Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: the Pareto correspondence and a generalization
- Implementation via rights structures
- A simple mechanism for double implementation with semi-socially-responsible agents
- Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
- Strong implementation with partially honest individuals
- Subgame-perfect implementation of bargaining solutions.
- Nash implementation in production economies
- Nash-implementation of competitive equilibria via a bounded mechanism
- Bayesian implementation with verifiable information
- Reaching consensus through approval bargaining
- Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents
- Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms
- Strictly strategy-proof auctions
- Iterated elimination procedures
- Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
- Robust implementation in weakly perfect Bayesian strategies
- Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions
- Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs
- Do coalitions matter in designing institutions?
- Implementation without expected utility: ex-post verifiability
- Integer game with delay
- Constrained implementation
- Choosing the winner of a competition using natural mechanisms: conditions based on the jury
- Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals
- Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization
- Nash implementation and the bargaining problem
- Divide-and-permute
- Outcome-robust mechanisms for Nash implementation
- Mixed Bayesian implementation in general environments
- One-step-ahead implementation
- Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
- Finite supermodular design with interdependent valuations
- Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem
- Iterated strict dominance in general games
- Undominated strategies and coordination in normalform games
- Continuous virtual implementation: complete information
- Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information
- Subgame perfect implementation of the deserving winner of a competition with natural mechanisms
- Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
- A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction
- Picking the winners
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1082128 (Why is no real title available?)
- Implementation with evidence
- A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites
- Rationalizable implementation of correspondences
- Recent Results on Implementation with Complete Information
- Implementation theory
- A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants
- Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms
- Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima
- Implementing optimal scholarship assignments via backward induction
- Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching
- Iterated bounded dominance
- Implementation in strong core by codes of rights
- Binary mechanism for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences
- Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation
- A characterization of equilibria in the Groves-Ledyard mechanism
- Designing rotation programs: limits and possibilities
- Implementation via mechanisms with transfers
- Robust implementation in general mechanisms
- Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium
- Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
- A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies
- Direct implementation with evidence
- Capacity design in school choice
- Save, spend, or give? A model of housing, family insurance, and savings in old age
- Hazed and confused: the effect of air pollution on dementia
- IQ, expectations, and choice
- Optimal feedback in contests
- Unemployment insurance in macroeconomic stabilization
- A welfare analysis of occupational licensing in U.S. states
- A network solution to robust implementation: the case of identical but unknown distributions
- A more credible approach to parallel trends
- Testing the production approach to markup estimation
- Stratification trees for adaptive randomisation in randomised controlled trials
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- Nash implementation of supermajority rules
- Safe implementation
- Eliciting the deserving winner in the presence of enemies
- Pathologies of iterated strict dominance revisited
- The difference between the weak core and the strong core from the design point of view
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