Nash implementation of supermajority rules

DOI10.1007/S00182-024-00888-1MaRDI QIDQ6665438zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Pablo Amorós

Publication date 17 January 2025

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S00182-024-00888-1

zbMATH Keywords

aggregation of experts' judgmentsNash implementationsupermajority rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory (91Axx)

Recommendations

• Using supermajority rules to aggregate judgments of possibly biased experts
• Implementation in dominant strategies of quota rules to choose one candidate
• Evaluation and strategic manipulation
• Using sub-majoritarian rules to select the winner of a competition
• Unequivocal majority and Maskin-monotonicity

Cites work

• A natural mechanism for eliciting rankings when jurors have favorites
• Aggregating experts' opinions to select the winner of a competition
• An axiomatic analysis of the papal conclave
• Characterizing minimal impartial rules for awarding prizes
• Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
• Impartial nominations for a prize
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Picking the winners
• Selecting winners with partially honest jurors
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Symmetry and impartial lotteries
• Unequivocal majority and Maskin-monotonicity
• Using supermajority rules to aggregate judgments of possibly biased experts

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