Unequivocal majority and Maskin-monotonicity
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Publication:1039561
DOI10.1007/s00355-009-0377-5zbMath1186.91085MaRDI QIDQ1039561
Publication date: 23 November 2009
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://theeconomics.uma.es/malagawpseries/Papers/METCwp2008-3.pdf
91B14: Social choice
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Cites Work
- A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
- The Borda rule, Condorcet consistency and Condorcet stability
- The implementation of social choice functions via social choice correspondences: A general formulation and a limit result
- A crash course in implementation theory
- Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules
- Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality