Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives

Cited in

(44)

A geometric study of shareholders' voting in incomplete markets: Multivariate median and mean shareholder theorems
The uncovered set and indifference in spatial models: a fuzzy set approach
Tax rules
Condorcet winners and social acceptability
Special majority rules and the existence of voting equilibria
The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results
Triple-acyclicity in majorities based on difference in support
On the reversal bias of the minimax social choice correspondence
Anonymous and neutral majority rules
On the core of voting games
Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
A note on balancedness and nonemptiness of the core in voting games
Smooth social choice
Probabilities of preferences and cycles with super majority rules
The probability of Condorcet cycles and super majority rules
Social choice and cooperative game theory: voting games as social aggregation functions
Corporate self-regulation of imperfect competition
Production externalities: internalization by voting
The core of voting games: a partition approach
Political competition in a model of economic growth: Some theoretical results
Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences
Stable voting procedures for committees in economic environments
Consistent voting rules for competitive local public goods economies
ON THE CHACTERISTIC NUMBERS OF VOTING GAMES
Toward a \(50\%\)-majority equilibrium when voters are symmetrically distributed
How bad can a voting locating be
A brief history of social choice and welfare theory
Quota games and stability set of order \(d\)
Full Nash implementation of neutral social functions
Flexible majority rules in democracyville: a guided tour
Unifying voting theory from Nakamura's to Greenberg's theorems
Voting over investment
Unequivocal majority and Maskin-monotonicity
The structure of continuous-valued neutral monotonic social functions
A critique of distributional analysis in the spatial model
Balancedness, nonemptiness of the core and the existence of a majority equilibrium
Classification theorem for smooth social choice on a manifold
Bounds for the Nakamura number
Inequalities and segregation: can welfarist local governments struggle against both simultaneously?
Dominance in spatial voting with imprecise ideals
Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets
The general relevance of the impossibility theorem in smooth social choice
Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions
Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms

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