Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives
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Publication:3857964
DOI10.2307/1910410zbMATH Open0423.90007OpenAlexW2055742692MaRDI QIDQ3857964FDOQ3857964
Publication date: 1979
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1910410
votingsocial choicenecessary and sufficient conditioncompact sets of alternativesconsistent majority rulesd-majority equilibrium
Cited In (44)
- A geometric study of shareholders' voting in incomplete markets: Multivariate median and mean shareholder theorems
- The uncovered set and indifference in spatial models: a fuzzy set approach
- Tax rules
- Condorcet winners and social acceptability
- Special majority rules and the existence of voting equilibria
- The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results
- Triple-acyclicity in majorities based on difference in support
- On the reversal bias of the minimax social choice correspondence
- Anonymous and neutral majority rules
- On the core of voting games
- Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
- A note on balancedness and nonemptiness of the core in voting games
- Smooth social choice
- Corporate self-regulation of imperfect competition
- Social choice and cooperative game theory: voting games as social aggregation functions
- Probabilities of preferences and cycles with super majority rules
- The probability of Condorcet cycles and super majority rules
- Production externalities: internalization by voting
- Political competition in a model of economic growth: Some theoretical results
- Stable voting procedures for committees in economic environments
- Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences
- ON THE CHACTERISTIC NUMBERS OF VOTING GAMES
- Consistent voting rules for competitive local public goods economies
- Toward a \(50\%\)-majority equilibrium when voters are symmetrically distributed
- A brief history of social choice and welfare theory
- How bad can a voting locating be
- Quota games and stability set of order \(d\)
- The Core of Voting Games: A Partition Approach
- Full Nash implementation of neutral social functions
- Unifying voting theory from Nakamura's to Greenberg's theorems
- Voting over investment
- Flexible majority rules in democracyville: a guided tour
- Unequivocal majority and Maskin-monotonicity
- The structure of continuous-valued neutral monotonic social functions
- A critique of distributional analysis in the spatial model
- Balancedness, nonemptiness of the core and the existence of a majority equilibrium
- Classification theorem for smooth social choice on a manifold
- Inequalities and segregation: can welfarist local governments struggle against both simultaneously?
- Bounds for the Nakamura number
- Dominance in spatial voting with imprecise ideals
- Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets
- The general relevance of the impossibility theorem in smooth social choice
- Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions
- Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms
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