The general relevance of the impossibility theorem in smooth social choice
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Publication:1069833
DOI10.1007/BF00141673zbMath0584.90005MaRDI QIDQ1069833
Publication date: 1984
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
agenda manipulationcycle setvoting gamesvoting processesinfinite electoratesmooth choice spacestructure induced equilibria
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