Existence of a "Local" Co-operative Equilibrium in a Class of Voting Games

DOI10.2307/2296704MaRDI QIDQ4094691zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gerald H. Kramer, Alvin K. Klevorick

Publication date 1974

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d03/d0343.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Utility theory (91B16)

Cited in

(10)

• The general relevance of the impossibility theorem in smooth social choice
• On the generic emptiness of the local core of voting games
• New perspectives in competitive location theory
• Directional and local electoral equilibria with probabilistic voting
• A general possibility theorem for group decision rules with Pareto- transitivity
• A further result on the core of voting games
• A dynamical model of political equilibrium
• Downsian competition when no policy is unbeatable
• Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets
• Classification theorem for smooth social choice on a manifold

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