Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets
The object studied in the paper is a voting game \(\sigma\) in which each of the players i has a preference relation \(P_ i\) defined over the same set of alternatives W; special emphasis is given to the case of \(P_ i\) generated by (differentiable) utility functions \(u_ i.\) The principal aim of the paper is to investigate local solution concepts of the game determined mainly in terms of the derivatives of \(u_ i\) such as infinitesimal optima, infinitesimal cycles, local cycles, directional core etc. Additionally, the existence of a choice (i.e. an element of W optimal for players in a winning coalition) is also considered. According to the author's own estimation, the principal result of the paper is that if the dimension of W does not exceed the Nakamura number of \(\sigma\) minus 2 then there is a nonempty directional core at every point in W. Generally, the author tries to relax the assumptions which are standard within this framework (e.g. convexity to local acyclicity). The paper generalizes some earlier results including those due to \textit{J. Greenberg} [Econometrica 47, 627-636 (1979; Zbl 0423.90007)].
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- The structure of continuous-valued neutral monotonic social functions
- Special majority rules and the existence of voting equilibria
- Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions
- Structural instability of the core
- On the core of voting games
- A note on balancedness and nonemptiness of the core in voting games
- Smooth social choice
- Probability and convergence for supra-majority rule with Euclidean preferences
- Far-sightedness and the voting paradox
- Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial model
- The ``probability of a fit choice
- Bounds for the Nakamura number
- Social choice and cooperative game theory: voting games as social aggregation functions
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- General conditions for the existence of maximal elements via the uncovered set
- Classification theorem for smooth social choice on a manifold
- The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results
- Existence of a multicameral core
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