Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(84)90040-1MaRDI QIDQ798550zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Norman Schofield

Publication date 1984

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170921-163009131

zbMATH Keywords

Nakamura numbervoting gameinfinitesimal optima, infinitesimal cycles, local cycles, directional corelocal solution conceptssocial equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14) Cooperative games (91A12)

Recommendations

• Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial model
• On the generic emptiness of the local core of voting games
• Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions
• On the core of voting games
• The general relevance of the impossibility theorem in smooth social choice
• Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: the core without majority dissatisfaction
• A note on the core and von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions of simple games
• Weighted voting, multicameral representation, and power
• Social choice and cooperative game theory: voting games as social aggregation functions
• Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point

Cites work

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3186512 (Why is no real title available?)
• A generalization of Tychonoff's fixed point theorem
• Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives
• Continuous-Valued Binary Decision Procedures
• Existence of Equilibrium on a Manifold
• Existence of a "Local" Co-operative Equilibrium in a Class of Voting Games
• General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
• Generic properties of simple Bergson-Samuelson welfare functions
• Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
• Local Simple Games in Public Choice Mechanisms
• Majority Voting and Social Choice
• On the existence of maximal elements
• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences

Cited in

(21)

• Coalitions and catastrophic climate change
• Special majority rules and the existence of voting equilibria
• The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results
• Probability and convergence for supra-majority rule with Euclidean preferences
• Structural instability of the core
• On the core of voting games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2000142 (Why is no real title available?)
• A note on balancedness and nonemptiness of the core in voting games
• Smooth social choice
• Social choice and cooperative game theory: voting games as social aggregation functions
• Existence of a multicameral core
• The core of voting games: a partition approach
• Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial model
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4095248 (Why is no real title available?)
• Far-sightedness and the voting paradox
• The ``probability of a fit choice
• The structure of continuous-valued neutral monotonic social functions
• Classification theorem for smooth social choice on a manifold
• General conditions for the existence of maximal elements via the uncovered set
• Bounds for the Nakamura number
• Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions

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