Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(84)90040-1zbMATH Open0546.90002OpenAlexW1994809105MaRDI QIDQ798550FDOQ798550

Authors: Norman Schofield 

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170921-163009131

Recommendations

• Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial model
• On the generic emptiness of the local core of voting games
• Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions
• On the core of voting games
• The general relevance of the impossibility theorem in smooth social choice
• Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: the core without majority dissatisfaction
• A note on the core and von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions of simple games
• Weighted voting, multicameral representation, and power
• Social choice and cooperative game theory: voting games as social aggregation functions
• Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point

zbMATH Keywords

Nakamura numbervoting gameinfinitesimal optima, infinitesimal cycles, local cycles, directional corelocal solution conceptssocial equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14) Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

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• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
• A generalization of Tychonoff's fixed point theorem
• Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
• General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
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• Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives
• Majority Voting and Social Choice
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• On the existence of maximal elements
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• Existence of Equilibrium on a Manifold
• Generic properties of simple Bergson-Samuelson welfare functions
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• Continuous-Valued Binary Decision Procedures
• Existence of a "Local" Co-operative Equilibrium in a Class of Voting Games
• Local Simple Games in Public Choice Mechanisms

Cited In (21)

• Special majority rules and the existence of voting equilibria
• The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results
• Probability and convergence for supra-majority rule with Euclidean preferences
• Structural instability of the core
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On the core of voting games
• A note on balancedness and nonemptiness of the core in voting games
• Smooth social choice
• Social choice and cooperative game theory: voting games as social aggregation functions
• Existence of a multicameral core
• Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial model
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The ``probability of a fit choice
• Far-sightedness and the voting paradox
• Coalitions and Catastrophic Climate Change
• The Core of Voting Games: A Partition Approach
• The structure of continuous-valued neutral monotonic social functions
• Classification theorem for smooth social choice on a manifold
• Bounds for the Nakamura number
• General conditions for the existence of maximal elements via the uncovered set
• Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions

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