Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: the core without majority dissatisfaction

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2010.06.008zbMATH Open1236.91023DBLPjournals/geb/KumabeM11arXiv1107.0431OpenAlexW2122776163WikidataQ56114307 ScholiaQ56114307MaRDI QIDQ536092FDOQ536092

Authors: Masahiro Kumabe, H. Reiju Mihara 

Publication date: 16 May 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: Acyclicity of individual preferences is a minimal assumption in social choice theory. We replace that assumption by the direct assumption that preferences have maximal elements on a fixed agenda. We show that the core of a simple game is nonempty for all profiles of such preferences if and only if the number of alternatives in the agenda is less than the Nakamura number of the game. The same is true if we replace the core by the core without majority dissatisfaction, obtained by deleting from the agenda all the alternatives that are non-maximal for all players in a winning coalition. Unlike the core, the core without majority dissatisfaction depends only on the players' sets of maximal elements and is included in the union of such sets. A result for an extended framework gives another sense in which the core without majority dissatisfaction behaves better than the core.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1107.0431

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zbMATH Keywords

coreNakamura numbersimple gamesmaximal elementsacyclic preferenceskappa numberlimit ordinalsvoting games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cited In (6)

• Computability of simple games: a complete investigation of the sixty-four possibilities
• Non-emptiness of the core: Low multi-dimensional decisions spaces and one-dimensional preferences
• Committees under qualified majority rules: the one-core stability index
• The stability of decision making in committees: the one-core
• Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets
• Acyclic social choice from finite sets

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