Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2482640
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.05.012zbMath1133.91314arXiv0705.3227WikidataQ56060514 ScholiaQ56060514MaRDI QIDQ2482640
Masahiro Kumabe, H. Reiju Mihara
Publication date: 23 April 2008
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/0705.3227
Turing computability; recursion theory; voting games; infinitely many players; computable manuals and contracts
91A07: Games with infinitely many players
Related Items
Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: the core without majority dissatisfaction, Computability of simple games: a complete investigation of the sixty-four possibilities, The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games, Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Computational complexity in the design of voting rules
- Computability of simple games: a complete investigation of the sixty-four possibilities
- The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
- The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games
- Precisely dictatorial social welfare functions
- Social choice and computational complexity
- An infinite version of Arrow's theorem in the effective setting
- Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election
- Minimally generated Boolean algebras
- Arrow's theorem with restricted coalition algebras
- Classical recursion theory. The theory of functions and sets of natural numbers.
- Non-computability of competitive equilibrium
- Arrow's theorem and Turing computability
- Anonymity and neutrality in Arrow's Theorem with restricted coalition algebras
- Voting games and acyclic collective choice rules
- On the computability of Nash equilibria
- On computational complexity of membership test in flow games and linear production games
- A note on the core of voting games
- May's theorem with an infinite population
- Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games
- The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
- Acyclic social choice from finite sets
- Arrow's theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators
- Computable preference and utility
- Existence of a coalitionally strategyproof social choice function: a constructive proof
- Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core
- Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model
- Anonymity in large societies
- Learning Rational Expectations Under Computability Constraints
- A New Solution Concept for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments
- Rationality, Computability, and Nash Equilibrium
- On the Complexity of Cooperative Solution Concepts
- Cooperation and Punishment
- Incomplete Written Contracts: Undescribable States of Nature
- Cooperation and Effective Computability
