Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core
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Publication:2482640
Abstract: The class of algorithmically computable simple games (i) includes the class of games that have finite carriers and (ii) is included in the class of games that have finite winning coalitions. This paper characterizes computable games, strengthens the earlier result that computable games violate anonymity, and gives examples showing that the above inclusions are strict. It also extends Nakamura's theorem about the nonemptyness of the core and shows that computable games have a finite Nakamura number, implying that the number of alternatives that the players can deal with rationally is restricted.
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