An infinite version of Arrow's theorem in the effective setting

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(88)90003-0zbMath0654.90003OpenAlexW2012774000MaRDI QIDQ1108914

Alain A. Lewis

Publication date: 1988

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(88)90003-0

zbMATH Keywords

votingArrow's theoreminfinite set of alternativesinfinite set of voters

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (6)

Arrow's theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators ⋮ Some aspects of effectively constructive mathematics that are relevant to the foundations of neoclassical mathematical economics and the theory of games ⋮ Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core ⋮ Computability of simple games: a complete investigation of the sixty-four possibilities ⋮ On the independence of core-equivalence results from Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory ⋮ The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games

Cites Work

• On diophantine equations over the ring of all algebraic integers
• Recursion theory on fields and abstract dependence
• Extensions of the measurable choice theorem by means of forcing
• Arithmetic over the rings of all algebraic integers.
• Recursively enumerable sets and degrees
• Ultrafilters on a countable set
• Ramsey's theorem and recursion theory
• On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem
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