Arrow's theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(98)00061-5zbMath0955.91014WikidataQ55899881 ScholiaQ55899881MaRDI QIDQ1961954

H. Reiju Mihara

Publication date: 4 March 2001

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

recursion theory; Arrow's impossibility theorem; social welfare function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B14: Social choice

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