Social choice and computational complexity

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(88)90022-5MaRDI QIDQ1101310zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Jerry S. Kelly

Publication date 1988

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(88)90022-5

zbMATH Keywords

computational complexitycomputable rulessimple majority votinguncomputable rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25)

Recommendations

• The Computational Complexity of Choice Sets
• Voting procedures, complexity of
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• Computational complexity in the design of voting rules
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3664335 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3291134 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3387326 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate

Cited in

(23)

• The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games
• Social choice and individual values in the electronic republic
• Arrow's theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators
• Developing the aggregate empirical side of computational social choice
• Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games
• Social choice among complex objects
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3961285 (Why is no real title available?)
• Introduction to computational social choice
• On the computability of quasi-transitive binary social choice rules in an infinite society and the halting problem
• Computability of simple games: a complete investigation of the sixty-four possibilities
• Cycles and intractability in a large class of aggregation rules
• A Short Introduction to Computational Social Choice
• Algorithms, approximation, and empirical studies in behavioral and computational social choice -- preface
• Reduction theorems in the social choice theory
• Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core
• Computability and randomness of Nash equilibrium in infinite games
• \(k\)-majority digraphs and the hardness of voting with a constant number of voters
• Computational complexity in the design of voting rules
• Aggregation of votes with multiple positions on each issue
• How hard is it to compute majority-preserving judgment aggregation rules?
• On the computability of binary social choice rules in an infinite society and the halting problem
• Voting procedures, complexity of
• On the difficulty of making social choices

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