Reduction theorems in the social choice theory
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Publication:6174465
DOI10.1007/S10958-023-06463-5zbMATH Open1518.91071OpenAlexW4377098787WikidataQ123127288 ScholiaQ123127288MaRDI QIDQ6174465FDOQ6174465
Authors: N. L. Polyakov, M. V. Shamolin 
Publication date: 14 July 2023
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Sciences (New York) (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10958-023-06463-5
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