Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games
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Publication:1763192
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2004.04.001zbMath1080.91009OpenAlexW2171952212MaRDI QIDQ1763192
Publication date: 22 February 2005
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2004.04.001
Related Items (4)
Continuity of social choice functions with restricted coalition algebras ⋮ Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core ⋮ Computability of simple games: a complete investigation of the sixty-four possibilities ⋮ The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games
Cites Work
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- Precisely dictatorial social welfare functions
- Arrow's theorem with restricted coalition algebras
- Arrow's theorem and Turing computability
- Anonymity and neutrality in Arrow's Theorem with restricted coalition algebras
- Arrow's theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators
- Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model
- Anonymity in large societies
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