Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2004.04.001zbMath1080.91009OpenAlexW2171952212MaRDI QIDQ1763192

H. Reiju Mihara

Publication date: 22 February 2005

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2004.04.001

zbMATH Keywords

TuringRecursion theoryUltrafiltersVoting gamesInfinitely many players

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

Related Items (4)

Continuity of social choice functions with restricted coalition algebras ⋮ Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core ⋮ Computability of simple games: a complete investigation of the sixty-four possibilities ⋮ The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games

Cites Work

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• Precisely dictatorial social welfare functions
• Arrow's theorem with restricted coalition algebras
• Arrow's theorem and Turing computability
• Anonymity and neutrality in Arrow's Theorem with restricted coalition algebras
• Arrow's theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators
• Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model
• Anonymity in large societies

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