scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3898540
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3677437
Recommendations
- Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
- A new informational base for social choice
- Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2182815
- Gibbard-Satterthwaite games for k-approval voting rules
Cited in
(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Fundamentals of simple games from a viewpoint of blockability relations
- Minimal and locally minimal games and game forms
- A proof that the core of an ordinal convex game is a von Neumann- Morgenstern solution
- On strong representations of games by social choice functions
- Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
- Stable effectivity functions with an infinity of players and alternatives
- Stability of topological effectivity functions
- On the core of voting games
- Cores and capacities of compound simple games
- A new approach to the implementation problem
- Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees
- Neutral veto correspondences with a continuum of alternatives
- Stable extensive game forms with perfect information
- A note of tight extensive game forms
- A new informational base for social choice
- On conditions for a meeting not to reach a deadlock
- Self-optimality and efficiency in utility distortion games
- Characterization of desirable information processing and decision making systems in organization
- Necessary and sufficient conditions for l-stability of games in constitutional form
- Tight and effectively rectangular game forms: A Nash solvable class
- Quality of group decisions
- Decomposable effectivity functions
- On conditions for a meeting not to reach a recurrent argument
- A cooperative analysis of covert collusion in oligopolistic industries
- Vetoing in social choice with blockings
- Voting games and acyclic collective choice rules
- On necessary and sufficient conditions for solvability of game forms.
- Exact stability and its applications to strong solvability
- Strategy-proofness, Pareto optimality and strictly convex norms
- A note on the core of voting games
- New interpretation of the core of simple games in terms of voters' permission.
- On consistent coalitions in group decision making with flexible decision makers.
- Meetings in deadlock and decision makers with interperception.
- Representations of political power structures by strategically stable game forms: a survey
- Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoers
- Separable discrete functions: recognition and sufficient conditions
- Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games
- On the Arrow property
- A non-parametric approach to testing the axioms of the Shapley value with limited data
- Monotone bargaining is Nash-solvable
- On some combinatorial problems arising in the theory of voting games
- Core implementation via dynamic game forms
- Non-cooperative implementation: A survey of recent results
- Generalizations of the concept of core of simple games and their characterization in terms of permission of voters.
- A Fourier-theoretic perspective on the Condorcet paradox and Arrow's theorem.
- Nash and strongly consistent two-player game forms
- Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results
- Stability and index of the meet game on a lattice
- Stable effectivity functions and perfect graphs
- The structure of two-valued coalitional strategy-proof social choice functions
- A brief history of social choice and welfare theory
- The Italian referendum: what can we get from game theory?
- Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibrium
- Power indices for networks, with applications to matching markets
- Binary strategy-proof social choice functions with indifference
- On effectivity functions of game forms
- An axiomatic approach to predictability of outcomes in an interactive setting
- Nontransitive preferences in decision theory
- A qualitative theory of conflict resolution and political compromise
- On the existence of strong Nash equilibria
- Maskin-monotonic scoring rules
- Choosing \(k\) from \(m\): feasible elimination procedures reconsidered
- Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers
- A method to compare influence of coalitions on group decision other than desirability relation
- Freedom of choice in a social context: comparing game forms
- First and second best voting rules in committees
- Directed graphical structure, Nash equilibrium, and potential games
- Bounds for the Nakamura number
- Lexicographic composition of simple games
- Perfect graphs, kernels, and cores of cooperative games
- On credible coalitional deviations by prudent players
- A policy-based rationalization of collective rules: dimensionality, specialized houses, and decentralized authority
- Book review of: Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters, Strategic social choice. Stable representations of constitutions
- War and peace in veto voting
- A characterization of completeness of blockability relations with respect to unanimity
- Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences
- Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
- Deriving consensus in multiagent systems
- From Black's advice and Arrow's theorem to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite result
- Approval as an intrinsic part of preference
- Voting for Committees in Agreeable Societies
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3864918 (Why is no real title available?)
- Voting by Committees
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1315832 (Why is no real title available?)
- The structure of unstable power mechanisms
- The Manipulability of Voting Systems
- Strong convexity of NTU games
- A theory of farsightedness in committee games
- A model of consensus and consensus building within the framework of committees with permissible ranges of decision makers
- Analyzing Electoral Promises with Game Theory
- Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in strong equilibrium
- Social Choice Theory
- Voting procedures, complexity of
- Balancing the power to appoint officers
- Implementation by mediated equilibrium
- Comparability of coalitions in committees with permission of voters by using desirability relation with hopefulness relation.
- Symmetry of simple games and permission of voters.
- Stable voting procedures for committees in economic environments
- Computing lexicographically safe Nash equilibria in finite two-person games with tight game forms given by oracles
- Similarities, differences, and preservation of efficiencies, with application to attitude analysis, within the graph model for conflict resolution
This page was built for publication:
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3677437)
