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Publication:3677437
zbMath0563.90002MaRDI QIDQ3677437
Publication date: 1984
Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Decision theory (91B06) Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Group preferences (91B10) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to operations research and mathematical programming (90-02) Social choice (91B14)
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