Neutral veto correspondences with a continuum of alternatives
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3864918 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3817377 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3898540 (Why is no real title available?)
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3400017 (Why is no real title available?)
- Cores of Convex Games Without Side Payments
- Cores of convex games
- Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
- ON THE EXISTENCE OF THE CORE OF A CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTION GAME WITH ORDINAL PREFERENCES
- Representations of simple games by social choice functions
- The Proportional Veto Principle
- The core of a simple game with ordinal preferences
- The strategy-proof social choice functions
- Voting with Proportional Veto Power
Cited in
(6)- Stability of topological effectivity functions
- Book review of: Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters, Strategic social choice. Stable representations of constitutions
- Vetoing: social, logical and mathematical aspects
- Nash consistent representation of constitutions: A reaction to the Gibbard paradox.
- A model of influence with a continuum of actions
- Open problems in veto theory
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