Neutral veto correspondences with a continuum of alternatives

DOI10.1007/BF01254544zbMATH Open0651.90096MaRDI QIDQ1106744FDOQ1106744

Authors: S. H. Smith 

Publication date: 1988

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Recommendations

• The structure of continuous-valued neutral monotonic social functions
• Convexity of integer veto and elimination procedures
• Veto in fixed agenda social choice correspondences
• Acyclicity and the dispersion of the veto power
• Voting by veto and the role of the compromise function

zbMATH Keywords

Stabilitycontinuum of alternatives\(\mu\)-neutral VCinfinite issue setveto correspondencesveto theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

• The core of a simple game with ordinal preferences
• Cores of convex games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Cores of Convex Games Without Side Payments
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Voting with Proportional Veto Power
• Representations of simple games by social choice functions
• The Proportional Veto Principle
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The strategy-proof social choice functions
• ON THE EXISTENCE OF THE CORE OF A CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTION GAME WITH ORDINAL PREFERENCES

Cited In (6)

• Stability of topological effectivity functions
• Book review of: Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters, Strategic social choice. Stable representations of constitutions
• Vetoing: social, logical and mathematical aspects
• Nash consistent representation of constitutions: A reaction to the Gibbard paradox.
• A model of influence with a continuum of actions
• Open problems in veto theory

This page was built for publication: Neutral veto correspondences with a continuum of alternatives

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1106744)