Neutral veto correspondences with a continuum of alternatives

DOI10.1007/BF01254544zbMath0651.90096MaRDI QIDQ1106744

S. H. Smith

Publication date: 1988

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Stabilitycontinuum of alternatives\(\mu\)-neutral VCinfinite issue setveto correspondencesveto theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

Stability of topological effectivity functions ⋮ A model of influence with a continuum of actions ⋮ Book review of: Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters, Strategic social choice. Stable representations of constitutions ⋮ Nash consistent representation of constitutions: A reaction to the Gibbard paradox.

Cites Work

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• Cores of Convex Games Without Side Payments
• ON THE EXISTENCE OF THE CORE OF A CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTION GAME WITH ORDINAL PREFERENCES
• Voting with Proportional Veto Power
• The Proportional Veto Principle

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