Book review of: Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters, Strategic social choice. Stable representations of constitutions

DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0595-5zbMATH Open1288.00035OpenAlexW2145696312MaRDI QIDQ2452268FDOQ2452268

Authors: Agnieszka Rusinowska 

Publication date: 2 June 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0595-5

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10) Social choice (91B14) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) External book reviews (00A17) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

Cites Work

• Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games
• Game Theory
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• Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
• Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models
• Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights
• Representation of effectivity functions by acceptable game forms: a complete characterization
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Nash consistent representation of constitutions: A reaction to the Gibbard paradox.
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On strong representations of games by social choice functions
• Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters
• On the continuity of representations of effectivity functions
• Neutral veto correspondences with a continuum of alternatives

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