Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 53233 (Why is no real title available?)
- Binary effectivity rules
- Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
- Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights
- Even-chance lotteries in social choice theory
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Nash consistent representation of constitutions: A reaction to the Gibbard paradox.
- Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
- Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
Cited in
(7)- Book review of: Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters, Strategic social choice. Stable representations of constitutions
- The structure of unstable power mechanisms
- On the continuity of representations of effectivity functions
- A stability index for local effectivity functions
- On existence of ex post Nash consistent representation for effectivity functions
- Uniform expected utility criteria for decision making under ignorance or objective ambiguity
- Nash consistent representation of constitutions: A reaction to the Gibbard paradox.
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