Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models
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Publication:1007773
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2008.02.009zbMATH Open1156.91328OpenAlexW2790107907MaRDI QIDQ1007773FDOQ1007773
Authors: Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters 
Publication date: 24 March 2009
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp404.pdf
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Cites Work
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
- Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
- Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights
- Nash consistent representation of constitutions: A reaction to the Gibbard paradox.
- Binary effectivity rules
- Even-chance lotteries in social choice theory
Cited In (7)
- Book review of: Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters, Strategic social choice. Stable representations of constitutions
- The structure of unstable power mechanisms
- On the continuity of representations of effectivity functions
- A stability index for local effectivity functions
- On existence of ex post Nash consistent representation for effectivity functions
- Uniform expected utility criteria for decision making under ignorance or objective ambiguity
- Nash consistent representation of constitutions: A reaction to the Gibbard paradox.
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