On effectivity functions of game forms
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Publication:2268107
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.09.002zbMath1201.91008OpenAlexW2111451969WikidataQ59560565 ScholiaQ59560565MaRDI QIDQ2268107
Endre Boros, Kazuhisa Makino, Khaled M. Elbassioni, Vladimir A. Gurvich
Publication date: 10 March 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.09.002
monotonetightself-dualtotally tighteffectivity functiongame formsuperadditivedual-minorweakly superadditive
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