On strong representations of games by social choice functions

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(86)90022-4MaRDI QIDQ1084029zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ron Holzman

Publication date 1986

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(86)90022-4

zbMATH Keywords

allocation of decision powerGames in characteristic functionstrong representation of simple games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

Review text

Games in characteristic function form are used to model an allocation of decision power among individuals involved in a voting situation. The problem of strong representation is to find a strategically acceptable social choice function that entails the allocation of power prescribed by a given game. Within the class of non-weak characteristic function games, we fully characterize the games that admit a strong representation. We apply this result to Peleg's problem of strong representation of simple games. Our results indicate that a strong representation requires significantly more than has been recognized in the literature.

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Cites work

• Consistent Voting Systems
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3862972 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3898540 (Why is no real title available?)
• Representation of characteristic function games by social choice functions
• Representations of simple games by social choice functions
• Social choice and individual values
• The capacity of a committee
• The Proportional Veto Principle
• The structure of exactly strongly consistent social choice functions

Cited in

(14)

• The capacity of a committee
• Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees
• Vetoing in social choice with blockings
• Representations of political power structures by strategically stable game forms: a survey
• Choosing \(k\) from \(m\): feasible elimination procedures reconsidered
• Book review of: Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters, Strategic social choice. Stable representations of constitutions
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1329111 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1445635 (Why is no real title available?)
• Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in strong equilibrium
• Stable voting procedures for committees in economic environments
• The representation of alienable and inalienable rights: Games in transition function form
• On strongly consistent social choice functions
• Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters
• On the continuity of representations of effectivity functions

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