On strong representations of games by social choice functions (Q1084029)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3976821
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| English | On strong representations of games by social choice functions |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3976821 |
Statements
On strong representations of games by social choice functions (English)
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1986
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Games in characteristic function form are used to model an allocation of decision power among individuals involved in a voting situation. The problem of strong representation is to find a strategically acceptable social choice function that entails the allocation of power prescribed by a given game. Within the class of non-weak characteristic function games, we fully characterize the games that admit a strong representation. We apply this result to Peleg's problem of strong representation of simple games. Our results indicate that a strong representation requires significantly more than has been recognized in the literature.
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Games in characteristic function
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allocation of decision power
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strong representation of simple games
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0.8332826495170593
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0.808060884475708
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0.807701051235199
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