Representation of characteristic function games by social choice functions
From MaRDI portal
Cites work
- A Social Choice Interpretation of the Von Neumann-Morgenstern Game
- Consistent Voting Systems
- ON THE EXISTENCE OF THE CORE OF A CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTION GAME WITH ORDINAL PREFERENCES
- Representations of simple games by social choice functions
- The independence of game theory of utility theory
- The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments
Cited in
(6)- Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters
- The capacity of a committee
- On the continuity of representations of effectivity functions
- Choosing \(k\) from \(m\): feasible elimination procedures reconsidered
- Stable voting procedures for committees in economic environments
- On strong representations of games by social choice functions
This page was built for publication: Representation of characteristic function games by social choice functions
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1148199)