Representation of characteristic function games by social choice functions

DOI10.1007/BF01771425MaRDI QIDQ1148199zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Shin Ishikawa, Kenjiro Nakamura

Publication date 1980

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01771425

zbMATH Keywords

simple gamesocial choice functionsrepresentation of characteristic function games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites work

• A Social Choice Interpretation of the Von Neumann-Morgenstern Game
• Consistent Voting Systems
• ON THE EXISTENCE OF THE CORE OF A CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTION GAME WITH ORDINAL PREFERENCES
• Representations of simple games by social choice functions
• The independence of game theory of utility theory
• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments

Cited in

(6)

• Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters
• The capacity of a committee
• On the continuity of representations of effectivity functions
• Choosing \(k\) from \(m\): feasible elimination procedures reconsidered
• Stable voting procedures for committees in economic environments
• On strong representations of games by social choice functions

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