A Social Choice Interpretation of the Von Neumann-Morgenstern Game

DOI10.2307/1911384zbMATH Open0382.90117OpenAlexW1986469867MaRDI QIDQ4160733FDOQ4160733

Authors: Stefan D. Bloomfield 

Publication date: 1976

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1911384

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cited In (4)

• The birth of social choice theory from the spirit of mathematical logic: Arrow's theorem in the framework of model theory
• Representation of characteristic function games by social choice functions
• Binary games in constitutional form and collective choice
• Voting games and acyclic collective choice rules

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