Representation of characteristic function games by social choice functions
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Publication:1148199
DOI10.1007/BF01771425zbMath0451.90008MaRDI QIDQ1148199
Shin Ishikawa, Kenjiro Nakamura
Publication date: 1980
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01771425
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Cites Work
- The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
- Representations of simple games by social choice functions
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments
- ON THE EXISTENCE OF THE CORE OF A CHARACTERISTIC FUNCTION GAME WITH ORDINAL PREFERENCES
- Consistent Voting Systems
- A Social Choice Interpretation of the Von Neumann-Morgenstern Game
- The independence of game theory of utility theory