Cited in
(56)- Properties of consistent voting systems
- Dominance solvable games and trees
- A policy-based rationalization of collective rules: dimensionality, specialized houses, and decentralized authority
- Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibrium
- Obituary: Bezalel Peleg (1936--2019)
- Individually Rational Strategy-Proof Social Choice with Exogenous Indifference Sets
- The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results
- The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
- Acyclicity of improvements in finite game forms
- Voting by veto and the role of the compromise function
- Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
- Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters
- Supermajority politics: equilibrium range, policy diversity, utilitarian welfare, and political compromise
- Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
- Vetoing in social choice with blockings
- The capacity of a committee
- Representation of characteristic function games by social choice functions
- The structure of exactly strongly consistent social choice functions
- Pareto improvements by Pareto strategic voting under majority voting with risk loving and risk avoiding voters -- A note
- Choosing \(k\) from \(m\): feasible elimination procedures reconsidered
- The Pareto rule and strategic voting
- Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in strong equilibrium
- Aggregation of preferences: a review
- Multivalued social choice functions and strategic manipulation with counterthreats
- On enforcing socially best alternatives of binary group decision rules
- Representations of political power structures by strategically stable game forms: a survey
- A note on manipulability of large voting schemes
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution social choice functions: An impossibility theorem
- Implementable social choice rules. Characterization and correspondence theorems under strong Nash equilibrium
- Stable voting procedures for committees in economic environments
- A condition for Nash-stability under binary and democratic group decision functions
- Committees under qualified majority rules: the one-core stability index
- Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules
- Implementing efficient, anonymous and neutral social choice functions
- ON THE CHACTERISTIC NUMBERS OF VOTING GAMES
- The stability of decision making in committees: the one-core
- Dimensions of election procedures: Analyses and comparisons
- Research in decision theory: A personal perspective
- Quota games and stability set of order d
- Weakly implementable social choice rules
- A theory of coalition formation in committees
- The strategy-proof social choice functions
- On strongly consistent social choice functions
- On the equilibrium of voting games with abstention and several levels of approval
- Power structure and cardinality restrictions for Paretian social choice rules
- Classification theorem for smooth social choice on a manifold
- On strong representations of games by social choice functions
- Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility
- Bounds for the Nakamura number
- The stability of multi-dimensional rules
- Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions
- Strategic equilibria and decisive set structures for social choice mechanisms
- Prudence versus sophistication in voting strategy
- Consistent social choice functions and systems of distinct representatives
- Representations of simple games by social choice functions
- Outcomes of admissible Nash equilibria and sophisticated voting when decisions are based on pairwise comparisons
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