Consistent Voting Systems
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Publication:4152292
DOI10.2307/1913652zbMath0373.90002OpenAlexW2005805506MaRDI QIDQ4152292
Publication date: 1978
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1913652
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