Consistent Voting Systems

Cited In (55)

Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility
A policy-based rationalization of collective rules: dimensionality, specialized houses, and decentralized authority
Self-implementation of Social Choice Correspondences in Strong Equilibrium
Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibrium
Obituary: Bezalel Peleg (1936--2019)
Individually Rational Strategy-Proof Social Choice with Exogenous Indifference Sets
The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results
The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
Acyclicity of improvements in finite game forms
Voting by veto and the role of the compromise function
Implementing a public project and distributing its cost
Supermajority politics: equilibrium range, policy diversity, utilitarian welfare, and political compromise
Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters
Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
Vetoing in social choice with blockings
The capacity of a committee
Representation of characteristic function games by social choice functions
The structure of exactly strongly consistent social choice functions
Pareto improvements by Pareto strategic voting under majority voting with risk loving and risk avoiding voters -- A note
Choosing \(k\) from \(m\): feasible elimination procedures reconsidered
The Pareto rule and strategic voting
Aggregation of preferences: a review
Multivalued social choice functions and strategic manipulation with counterthreats
On enforcing socially best alternatives of binary group decision rules
Representations of political power structures by strategically stable game forms: a survey
A note on manipulability of large voting schemes
Von Neumann-Morgenstern solution social choice functions: An impossibility theorem
Implementable social choice rules. Characterization and correspondence theorems under strong Nash equilibrium
Stable voting procedures for committees in economic environments
A condition for Nash-stability under binary and democratic group decision functions
Committees under qualified majority rules: the one-core stability index
Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules
ON THE CHACTERISTIC NUMBERS OF VOTING GAMES
Implementing efficient, anonymous and neutral social choice functions
The stability of decision making in committees: the one-core
Quota games and stability set of order \(d\)
Dimensions of election procedures: Analyses and comparisons
Research in decision theory: A personal perspective
Weakly implementable social choice rules
A theory of coalition formation in committees
The strategy-proof social choice functions
On strongly consistent social choice functions
On the equilibrium of voting games with abstention and several levels of approval
Power structure and cardinality restrictions for Paretian social choice rules
Classification theorem for smooth social choice on a manifold
On strong representations of games by social choice functions
Bounds for the Nakamura number
Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions
Strategic equilibria and decisive set structures for social choice mechanisms
Prudence versus sophistication in voting strategy
Consistent social choice functions and systems of distinct representatives
Representations of simple games by social choice functions
Outcomes of admissible Nash equilibria and sophisticated voting when decisions are based on pairwise comparisons
Properties of consistent voting systems
Dominance solvable games and trees

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