Pareto improvements by Pareto strategic voting under majority voting with risk loving and risk avoiding voters -- A note

DOI10.1007/BF01078985MaRDI QIDQ1908007zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors I. D. A. Macintyre

Publication date 28 February 1996

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

simple majority votingsincere preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• The Pareto rule and strategic voting
• Is it ever safe to vote strategically?
• The welfare consequences of strategic voting in two commonly used parliamentary agendas
• Ensuring Pareto optimality by referendum voting
• Pareto violations of parliamentary voting systems

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3635767 (Why is no real title available?)
• Consistent Voting Systems
• Manipulation under majority decision-making when no majority suffers and preferences are strict
• The Pareto rule and strategic voting

Cited in

(3)

• \(|N|\) cheers for democracy
• Ensuring Pareto optimality by referendum voting
• The welfare consequences of strategic voting in two commonly used parliamentary agendas

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