Manipulation under majority decision-making when no majority suffers and preferences are strict

DOI10.1007/BF01074957zbMATH Open0782.90004MaRDI QIDQ688540FDOQ688540

Authors: I. D. A. Macintyre 

Publication date: 10 January 1994

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Recommendations

• Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules
• Manipulation and bribery when aggregating ranked preferences
• Gains from manipulating social choice rules
• On the degree of manipulability of social choice rules
• On the manipulation of social choice correspondences
• Manipulability of choice aggregations
• Manipulation of preferences and relative utilitarianism
• Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules
• Minimal manipulability: unanimity and nondictatorship

zbMATH Keywords

majority votingmanipulationinterpersonal comparabilityRawlsian justice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Social choice and individual values
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Strategic voting under minimally binary group decision functions
• The Pareto rule and strategic voting

Cited In (6)

• On the universally beneficial manipulation conjecture
• The effects of communication on the occurrence of the tyranny of the majority under voting by veto
• Rank-dominant strategy and sincere voting
• Pareto improvements by Pareto strategic voting under majority voting with risk loving and risk avoiding voters -- A note
• Minimal manipulability: unanimity and nondictatorship
• Manipulability of majoritarian procedures in two-dimensional Downsian model

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