Manipulation under majority decision-making when no majority suffers and preferences are strict

DOI10.1007/BF01074957MaRDI QIDQ688540zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors I. D. A. Macintyre

Publication date 10 January 1994

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

majority votingmanipulationinterpersonal comparabilityRawlsian justice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Some further results on the manipulability of social choice rules
• Manipulation and bribery when aggregating ranked preferences
• Gains from manipulating social choice rules
• On the degree of manipulability of social choice rules
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• Manipulability of choice aggregations
• Manipulation of preferences and relative utilitarianism
• Strategic manipulability of self-selective social choice rules
• Minimal manipulability: unanimity and nondictatorship

Cites work

• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Social choice and individual values
• Strategic voting under minimally binary group decision functions
• The Pareto rule and strategic voting

Cited in

(6)

• Minimal manipulability: unanimity and nondictatorship
• On the universally beneficial manipulation conjecture
• The effects of communication on the occurrence of the tyranny of the majority under voting by veto
• Rank-dominant strategy and sincere voting
• Pareto improvements by Pareto strategic voting under majority voting with risk loving and risk avoiding voters -- A note
• Manipulability of majoritarian procedures in two-dimensional Downsian model

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