Minimal manipulability: unanimity and nondictatorship

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2006.04.014MaRDI QIDQ2641999zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Stefan Maus, Ton Storcken, Hans Peters

Publication date 20 August 2007

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/de37b66e-af8a-4df1-83ae-295e42669c7e

zbMATH Keywords

minimal manipulabilitynondictatorshipsocial choice functionsunanimity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) History, political science (91F10)

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Cites work

• Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
• Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1488103 (Why is no real title available?)
• Interjacency
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions
• Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity
• Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions
• On asymptotic strategy-proofness of classical social choice rules
• On the average minimum size of a manipulating coalition
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions

Cited in

(12)

• Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour
• Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions
• Dictatorship versus manipulability
• Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity
• Manipulability measures of common social choice functions
• Manipulability, unanimity, anonymity and merging functions
• Gains from manipulating social choice rules
• On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules
• Manipulation under majority decision-making when no majority suffers and preferences are strict
• Interjacency
• Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability
• Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions

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