On the average minimum size of a manipulating coalition
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Cites work
- Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but a few aren't
- Borda rule, Copeland method and strategic manipulation.
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 410740 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3854738 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1488103 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 765034 (Why is no real title available?)
- Manipulability measures of common social choice functions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- On probability models in voting theory
- Probability. Theory and examples.
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The majoritarian compromise in large societies
- The proportion of coalitionally unstable situations under the plurality rule
- The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences
Cited in
(12)- Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under impartial culture behaviour
- Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation
- How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election?
- A probabilistic evaluation framework for preference aggregation reflecting group homogeneity
- Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules
- Gains from manipulating social choice rules
- How the size of a coalition affects its chances to influence an election
- Minimal manipulability: unanimity and nondictatorship
- Democratic elections and centralized decisions: Condorcet and approval voting compared with median and coverage locations
- Is it ever safe to vote strategically?
- Smoothed analysis of social choice revisited
- Dichotomy for voting systems
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