The majoritarian compromise in large societies

DOI10.1007/S100580200085MaRDI QIDQ1811252zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Arkadii Slinko

Publication date 2002

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580200085

zbMATH Keywords

maximum welfaresocial choice rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

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Cited in

(6)

• Super majoritarianism and the endowment effect
• Characterizing majority rule: from profiles to societies
• Compromise in combinatorial vote
• The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable
• Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule
• On the average minimum size of a manipulating coalition

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