Does majoritarian approval matter in selecting a social choice rule? an exploratory panel study
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2500704
DOI10.1007/S00355-005-0024-8zbMATH Open1132.91398OpenAlexW2026944621MaRDI QIDQ2500704FDOQ2500704
Authors: Ayça E. Giritligil Kara, Murat R. Sertel 
Publication date: 18 August 2006
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-005-0024-8
Recommendations
- Majority-approval social choice
- Social choice by majority rule with rational participation
- On the (Sample) Condorcet efficiency of majority rule: An alternative view of majority cycles and social homogeneity
- Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule
- Triple-consistent social choice and the majority rule
- Choice by multirelations and the approval voting rule
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 18299
- How indeterminate is sequential majority voting? A judgement aggregation perspective
- Majority properties of positional social preference correspondences
- The dynamics of public opinion under majority rules
Cites Work
Cited In (8)
- Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule
- Does choosing committees from approval balloting fulfill the electorate's will?
- The majoritarian compromise in large societies
- The impartial, anonymous, and neutral culture model: a probability model for sampling public preference structures
- Why the Count de Borda cannot beat the Marquis de Condorcet
- Majority-approval social choice
- Voting: a machine learning approach
- Simultaneous elicitation of scoring rule and agent preferences for robust winner determination
This page was built for publication: Does majoritarian approval matter in selecting a social choice rule? an exploratory panel study
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2500704)
