Does majoritarian approval matter in selecting a social choice rule? an exploratory panel study

DOI10.1007/S00355-005-0024-8MaRDI QIDQ2500704zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ayça E. Giritligil Kara, Murat R. Sertel

Publication date 18 August 2006

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-005-0024-8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Majority-approval social choice
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• The dynamics of public opinion under majority rules

Cites work

• Partially monotonic bargaining solutions
• Self-Selective Social Choice Functions Verify Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorems
• The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable

Cited in

(8)

• The majoritarian compromise in large societies
• Majority-approval social choice
• Why the Count de Borda cannot beat the Marquis de Condorcet
• Voting: a machine learning approach
• Simultaneous elicitation of scoring rule and agent preferences for robust winner determination
• Does choosing committees from approval balloting fulfill the electorate's will?
• The impartial, anonymous, and neutral culture model: a probability model for sampling public preference structures
• Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule

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