Triple-consistent social choice and the majority rule
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Publication:456955
DOI10.1007/S11750-013-0300-1zbMATH Open1307.91072OpenAlexW2074732065MaRDI QIDQ456955FDOQ456955
Authors: Gilbert Laffond, Lainé, Jean 
Publication date: 26 September 2014
Published in: Top (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-013-0300-1
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Cites Work
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Cited In (5)
- Majority voting on restricted domains
- Triple-acyclicity in majorities based on difference in support
- Does majoritarian approval matter in selecting a social choice rule? an exploratory panel study
- Free triples, large indifference classes and the majority rule
- Intrinsic Limitations of the Majority Rule, an Algorithmic Approach
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