Triple-consistent social choice and the majority rule
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Publication:456955
DOI10.1007/s11750-013-0300-1zbMath1307.91072MaRDI QIDQ456955
Publication date: 26 September 2014
Published in: Top (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-013-0300-1
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