Triple-consistent social choice and the majority rule
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3646587 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5556709 (Why is no real title available?)
- A strong paradox of multiple elections
- Abstract Arrowian aggregation
- Acyclic sets of linear orders
- Acyclic sets of linear orders: a progress report
- Aggregation of binary evaluations
- Condorcet choice and the Ostrogorski paradox
- Ensuring Pareto optimality by referendum voting
- Judgment aggregation: (im)possibility theorems
- On constructing a generalized Ostrogorski paradox: Necessary and sufficient conditions
- On the theory of aggregation
- Only a dictatorship is efficient
- Pareto efficiency in multiple referendum
- Single-switch preferences and the Ostrogorski paradox
- The Simple Majority Decision Rule
- The ostrogorski paradox and its relation to nontransitive choice
- The paradox of multiple elections
- Unanimity and the Anscombe's paradox
- Voting for voters: A model of electoral evolution
- Voting for voters: the unanimity case
Cited in
(5)- Free triples, large indifference classes and the majority rule
- Does majoritarian approval matter in selecting a social choice rule? an exploratory panel study
- Majority voting on restricted domains
- Intrinsic Limitations of the Majority Rule, an Algorithmic Approach
- Triple-acyclicity in majorities based on difference in support
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