Triple-consistent social choice and the majority rule

DOI10.1007/S11750-013-0300-1MaRDI QIDQ456955zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gilbert Laffond, Lainé, Jean

Publication date 26 September 2014

Published in Top (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-013-0300-1

zbMATH Keywords

majority rulemultiple electionsArrovian aggregationstable domainstriple-consistency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3646587 (Why is no real title available?)
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• The ostrogorski paradox and its relation to nontransitive choice
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• Unanimity and the Anscombe's paradox
• Voting for voters: A model of electoral evolution
• Voting for voters: the unanimity case

Cited in

(5)

• Free triples, large indifference classes and the majority rule
• Does majoritarian approval matter in selecting a social choice rule? an exploratory panel study
• Majority voting on restricted domains
• Intrinsic Limitations of the Majority Rule, an Algorithmic Approach
• Triple-acyclicity in majorities based on difference in support

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