Ensuring Pareto optimality by referendum voting

DOI10.1007/S00355-006-0101-7MaRDI QIDQ2431824zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors İpek Özkal-Sanver, M. Remzi Sanver

Publication date 24 October 2006

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0101-7

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Pareto efficiency in multiple referendum
• Pareto violations of parliamentary voting systems
• Characterizing referenda with quorums via strategy-proofness
• Ordering Pareto-optima through majority voting
• Pareto improvements by Pareto strategic voting under majority voting with risk loving and risk avoiding voters -- A note

Cites work

• A new characterization of the majority rule
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• Another characterization of the majority rule.
• The paradox of multiple elections
• Yes-no voting

Cited in

(14)

• Sequential composition of voting rules in multi-issue domains
• Policies over time and Pareto optimality
• Pareto improvements by Pareto strategic voting under majority voting with risk loving and risk avoiding voters -- A note
• Designing referenda: an economist's pessimistic perspective
• When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?
• Compromise in combinatorial vote
• Condorcet choice and the Ostrogorski paradox
• Pareto violations of parliamentary voting systems
• Does choosing committees from approval balloting fulfill the electorate's will?
• Pareto efficiency in multiple referendum
• Triple-consistent social choice and the majority rule
• Ordering Pareto-optima through majority voting
• Only a dictatorship is efficient
• Voting behavior in one-shot and iterative multiple referenda

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