Designing referenda: an economist's pessimistic perspective

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2020.105133zbMATH Open1460.91086OpenAlexW3094792461MaRDI QIDQ1995292FDOQ1995292

Authors Siyang Xiong

Publication date 23 February 2021

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105133

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriasocial choicereferendumdictator

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Cooperative games (91A12)

Recommendations

• Ensuring Pareto optimality by referendum voting
• Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules
• Optimal voting rules
• Subgame perfect implementation of voting rules via randomized mechanisms
• Voting under constraints

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 44383 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Characterization of Game-Theoretic Solutions which Lead to Impossibility Theorems
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1.
• Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
• Implementation with Near-Complete Information
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
• Nash implementation without no-veto power
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information

Cited in

(5)

• A method for identifying parameterizations of the compensation election and quadratic voting that admit pure-strategy equilibria
• Referenda as a catch-22
• Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules
• Majority rip-off in referendum voting
• Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibrium

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