Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibrium

DOI10.1007/S00355-022-01420-8MaRDI QIDQ2103597zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yanyan Li

Publication date 9 December 2022

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-022-01420-8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3139273 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3898540 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 53233 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
• A crash course in implementation theory
• Consistent Voting Systems
• Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences
• Constitutional implementation.
• Construction of Outcome Functions Guaranteeing Existence and Pareto Optimality of Nash Equilibria
• Designing referenda: an economist's pessimistic perspective
• Effectivity Functions and Acceptable Game Forms
• Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms
• Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: the Pareto correspondence and a generalization
• Implementation via rights structures
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in strong equilibrium
• Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• Toward Natural Implementation
• Undominated strategies and coordination in normalform games

Cited in

(9)

• On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
• On combining implementable social choice rules
• Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
• Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in strong equilibrium
• Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms
• Intersection of Nash implementable social choice correspondences
• Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
• Self-optimality and efficiency in utility distortion games
• Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms: Applications.

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