Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibrium

DOI10.1007/S00355-022-01420-8zbMATH Open1505.91166OpenAlexW4285729708MaRDI QIDQ2103597FDOQ2103597

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 9 December 2022

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-022-01420-8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cites Work

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• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• A crash course in implementation theory
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• Toward Natural Implementation
• Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
• Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms
• Constitutional implementation.
• Consistent Voting Systems
• Implementation in undominated strategies by bounded mechanisms: the Pareto correspondence and a generalization
• Designing referenda: an economist's pessimistic perspective
• Undominated strategies and coordination in normalform games
• Construction of Outcome Functions Guaranteeing Existence and Pareto Optimality of Nash Equilibria
• Effectivity Functions and Acceptable Game Forms
• Implementation via rights structures
• Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences
• Self-implementation of Social Choice Correspondences in Strong Equilibrium

Cited In (4)

• On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
• Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
• Self-optimality and efficiency in utility distortion games
• Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms

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