Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms

DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(01)00054-4zbMath1013.91035MaRDI QIDQ5943172

Yoshikatsu Tatamitani

Publication date: 6 July 2003

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

implementation; decentralization; self-relevant mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B14: Social choice

Related Items

A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction, Procedurally fair implementation under complete information, Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies, Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms: Applications.

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