On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
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Publication:5896619
DOI10.1007/BF00183044zbMath0734.90007OpenAlexW2033798470MaRDI QIDQ5896619
Publication date: 1991
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00183044
Nash equilibriaexchange economysingle-peaked preferencessocial choice correspondencemonotonic preferencestwo-person public good economy
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