Implementation without rationality assumptions

DOI10.1007/S11238-011-9251-XMaRDI QIDQ430150zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ville Korpela

Publication date 20 June 2012

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-011-9251-x

zbMATH Keywords

Nash implementation\(n \geq 2\) playersMoore-Repullo setproperties \(\alpha \) and \(\gamma \)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Recommendations

• Rationalizable implementation
• Nash implementation theory - a note on full characterizations
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• On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
• Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences

Cites work

• (A,f): Choice with Frames¹
• A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
• Behavioral aspects of implementation theory
• Choice Functions and Revealed Preference
• Choice functions over a finite set: A summary
• Microeconomic theory
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
• Rational Selection of Decision Functions
• Role of honesty in full implementation
• Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
• The bargaining problem

Cited in

(10)

• Rationalizable implementation
• Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium
• A simple model of two-stage choice
• Behavioral strong implementation
• Behavioral aspects of implementation theory
• Computational implementation
• Behavioral implementation under incomplete information
• Implementation with a sympathizer
• A new approach to the implementation problem
• Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules

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