Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules
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Publication:523473
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.12.003zbMath1409.91101OpenAlexW2560592643MaRDI QIDQ523473
Publication date: 21 April 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.12.003
Individual preferences (91B08) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Social choice (91B14)
Related Items (6)
Deposit contract design with relatively partially honest agents ⋮ Implementation with a sympathizer ⋮ A simple mechanism for double implementation with semi-socially-responsible agents ⋮ Motives and implementation with rights structures ⋮ Strong implementation with partially honest individuals ⋮ Double implementation without no-veto-power
Cites Work
- Mechanism design and intentions
- To err is human: implementation in quantal response equilibria
- Implementation without rationality assumptions
- Rationalizable implementation
- Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
- Nash implementation without no-veto power
- Double implementation in Nash and strong Nash equilibria
- Behavioral aspects of implementation theory
- Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals
- Double implementation in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria
- Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
- Role of honesty in full implementation
- Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
- Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions
- Implementation with evidence
- Fault Tolerant Implementation
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- The Evolution of Conventions
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