Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.01.002MaRDI QIDQ2343379zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Juan Ortner

Publication date 5 May 2015

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.01.002

zbMATH Keywords

direct mechanismsimplementationmechanism designwhite lie aversion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
• Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
• Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
• Role of honesty in full implementation
• Strong implementation with partially honest individuals

Cites work

• Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
• Behavioral aspects of implementation theory
• Fault Tolerant Implementation
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3826915 (Why is no real title available?)
• Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• Implementation with evidence
• Implementation with Near-Complete Information
• Learning, Local Interaction, and Coordination
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
• Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
• Pigouvian pricing and stochastic evolutionary implementation
• Role of honesty in full implementation
• Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
• Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Subgame-perfect implementation under information perturbations
• The Evolution of Conventions
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information

Cited in

(18)

• Deposit contract design with relatively partially honest agents
• Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents
• Treading a fine line: (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partially-honest individuals
• Strong implementation with partially honest individuals
• Bayesian implementation with verifiable information
• Reaching consensus through approval bargaining
• Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents
• Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
• Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization
• Outcome-robust mechanisms for Nash implementation
• Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
• Role of honesty in full implementation
• Implementation with a sympathizer
• Recent Results on Implementation with Complete Information
• Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules
• Repeated communication with private lying costs
• Honesty and epistemological implementation of social choice functions with asymmetric information
• Strong Nash implementation and economic applications

This page was built for publication: Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2343379)